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“A good reputation is more valuable than money.” 
 –Publilius Syrus 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Trade and commerce are as old as human society itself. People have 
bartered and sought to enrich themselves for millennia, and they have 
sought more efficient and profitable ways to do so by devising various 
schemes and structures. Commonly, for example, traders and entrepre-
neurs banded together in partnerships with the hope of obtaining a col-
lective advantage. The idea of a “corporation” as we know it today was a 
long time coming. The corporation, which is derivative of the Latin 
corporare for “form into a body,” has roots in Roman law and the state-
sponsored colonial organizations such as The East India Company and 
the Hudson’s Bay Company of the seventeenth century.1 But recognizing 
the distinct identity and legal persona of a collective entity or institution, 
independent of its participating members, is a recent development. 
In the British Commonwealth, many consider the nineteenth centu-
ry case of Broderip v. Salomon to have cemented the modern corporation 
at the centre of today’s social and commercial life.2 The Salomon case 
began in the filthy backstreets of Dickensian London, where the Salomon 
family struggled to keep its boot-making business afloat. From these 
humble beginnings, the laws of corporate governance now facilitate the 
immense growth and influence of today’s mega-corporations. Many at-
tribute Salomon to establishing the corporation as a legal entity separate 
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from its owners and imposing a veil between the corporation and its 
shareholders.3 At least, that is how traditional scholarship would have it. 
Yet, upon closer inspection, the whole Salomon saga is revealed to 
be about much less and much more. For all but the corporate lawyer, Sa-
lomon is more helpfully understood as a decision that is less about the 
legal status of a corporate entity and more about the morality of business 
practices, including but not limited to, incorporation. In its commercial 
and social context, the case has little to say about incorporation and its 
legal consequences; the issue was more merely a pretext for the litigation 
than anything else. Rather, the case speaks more to the underlying issue 
of what counts as fair business dealing between people. The fact that the 
judicial inquiry into the Salomon business centered on the legal dimen-
sions of incorporation does not detract from the essentially ethical basis 
of the decision about whether Aron Salomon acted with appropriate de-
cency to people with whom he did business, especially his creditors. 
When understood in this way, Salomon opens up a very different range 
of topics for discussion. Rather than being reducible to a series of dry 
legal questions about the early history of modern incorporation, the case 
obliges us, as contemporary commentators, to confront the most basic of 
moral dilemmas: how do we handle keeping our moral obligations to 
others when doing so will result in catastrophic consequences for our-
selves? 
In this Essay, we revisit the Salomon case and its related litigation 
not only from a legal standpoint but also from a broader moral perspec-
tive.4 In the second Part, we offer a detailed context for and account of 
the Salomon litigation. The third Part focuses on the historical roots of 
the corporation and the judicial arguments in Salomon. In the fourth Part, 
we explore the moral and legal consequences of the Salomon decision. 
Throughout the Essay, our ambition will be not only to give the Salomon 
case a more contextual and richer spin but also to tackle the relationship 
between legal principles and moral obligations in the commercial world. 
Taking our cue from Ambrose Bierce, we explore whether the corpora-
tion is merely “[a]n ingenious device for obtaining profit without indi-
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vidual responsibility,” or whether it can be appreciated as something in 
which individual responsibility and profit-making can be combined.5 
II. COMING OF AGE 
A. A Foul Drain 
Whitechapel, in the East End of London, is still a hubbub of com-
mercial enterprise marked by both ethnic diversity and commercial inge-
nuity. But in the later decades of the nineteenth century, it was also a site 
of devastating poverty and dire squalor. If the old saw of “where there’s 
muck, there’s money” has any truth to it, then Whitechapel was a very 
rich place. For all its industrial wealth, it was more a cesspit than a Sili-
con Valley. It brimmed with breweries, tanneries, sweatshops, and abat-
toirs. The streets stunk with all manner of industrial effluence and moral 
decay: drunkards, prostitutes, and urchins, but also traders, entrepre-
neurs, and Salvationists. Alexis de Tocqueville’s words hit the mark: 
“From this foul drain the greatest stream of human industry flows out to 
fertilize the whole world. Here humanity attains its most complete devel-
opment and its most brutish, here civilization works its miracles and civi-
lized man is turned almost into a savage.”6 At this time, residents of 
Whitechapel and a cast of local characters fed off each other. For exam-
ple, the gruesome murders by Jack the Ripper baffled the authorities and 
plagued the nightmares of local denizens, the carnivalesque exploitation 
of Joseph “Elephant Man” Merrick captured public attention, and the 
socialist political beginnings of George Bernard Shaw and the Fabians 
and the revolutionary education of the exiled Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov 
(Lenin) were fostered. It was a time of great historical consequence, but 
for many in Whitechapel, the constant grind of daily life muted the ex-
citement.7 
One unheralded member of this group of East Enders was Aron Sa-
lomon. In 1859, Salomon was a young  man in his early twenties when 
he arrived in this latter-day Gomorrah from Velbert in Prussia (near to-
day’s Dusseldorf). As an Orthodox Jew, he soon became part of White-
chapel’s strong religious neighbourhood and married a local girl. Around 
this time, Jews were no longer encumbered with any particular legal or 
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formal prohibitions on carrying out business or participating in the com-
munity; the first Jewish Lord Mayor of London, David Salomons, was 
elected in 1855, and Lionel de Rothschild was permitted to take his 
elected seat in the House of Commons in 1858 when the oath of office 
was amended to include non-Christians. Nevertheless, there was still a 
strong current of anti-Semitism in London that pervaded business and, 
especially, the legal community elite. Aron Salomon was to be painted 
by some as the stereotypical “grasping merchant.” 
Despite the tough circumstances, Aron established himself in the 
community and began to operate as a boot and leather merchant. By 
1862, Aron and his wife, Schoontje, had their first child, Emanuel. The 
couple added to their family at regular intervals, and there was a brood of 
six children—four boys and two girls—by the mid-1870s. As his mer-
chant business thrived, Aron brought his sons into the business as they 
grew up. As a testament to his improved standing in the local business 
community, Aron was able to obtain the sponsorship of four local wor-
thies and become a naturalized citizen in 1873. Buoyed by government 
contracts, “Salomon & Sons” was now a reputed boot and leather mer-
chant and had become a fixture of Whitechapel High Street; they were no 
fly-by-night operation. 
Over the next twenty years or so, Salomon’s business went from 
strength to strength. Under the managerial initiative of Aron and his 
sons, it expanded and established itself in Northampton, the traditional 
center of England’s leather industry. Rather than trade under the Salo-
mon name alone, the family developed a couple of local firms, Fitzwell 
and Davy Brothers. The exact connection between Fitzwell and Aron 
Salomon himself remains hazy, and Davy Brothers was the later incarna-
tion of the Northampton factory that was run (and technically owned) by 
Aron’s son, David. The precise interrelationships of the family-owned 
group are unclear, but later suspicions of surreptitious money-shuffling 
complicated the controversy in which the Salomons would ultimately 
become embroiled.8 By the 1890s, however, the family-named business 
alone was valued at over £10,000 (over $1 million in U.S. dollars to-
day).9 
The business was probably so successful because the Salomons 
prided themselves on making high-quality products. In 1890, the firm 
                                                 
 8. For a detailed discussion of Davy Bros. and Fitzwell Ltd., see Rubin, supra note 4, at 112–
16. 
 9. Lord Macnaghten at the House of Lords identified that “if Mr. Salomon had been minded to 
dispose of his business in the market as a going concern he might fairly have counted upon retiring 
with at least 10,000l. in his pocket.” Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) 47 (ap-
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2012] Salomon Redux: The Moralities of Business 1113 
won the highest award for their military apparel at the Royal Military 
Exhibition in Chelsea. Indeed, when another manufacturer was chosen to 
supply the East End Jewish Boot Fund, Aron wrote to the Jewish Chron-
icle to complain that if he had been invited to tender for the role, he 
would have provided a superior product at cost price.10 
Moreover, in an age that was notorious for “sweat labour” (i.e., 
overworked and underpaid workers), the Salomon enterprises, while not 
without flaws or failings, stood somewhat apart from other exploitative 
employers in the leather trade because they did not overwork or under-
pay their employees. As devout Jews (and active in local synagogues), 
the Salomons made a practice of philanthropic giving to alleviate the 
tribulations of local indigents. Consequently, although the family was no 
friend at all to the nascent trade-union movement, Salomon & Sons could 
claim a sincere commitment to being an honorable and respected em-
ployer and merchant in its day. The Salomons were not just a business 
but active members of the community. 
In early 1892, when Aron decided to incorporate the business and 
obtain the benefits of limited liability, he was scrupulous in following the 
formal requirements of the Companies Act 1862.11 In all this discussion, 
it must be remembered that the whole transaction of incorporating a firm 
was artificial and somewhat silly—the law required documentation of 
ostensible “transactions” (between, effectively, Salomon and himself) 
where no funds ever changed hands and exchanges of value were of the 
most intangible form.12 But more of a concern than the legal ramifica-
tions was the moral quality of such a manoeuvre. While Aron might well 
have had a legal right or entitlement to incorporate his business, it was 
important to understand his motivations for doing so. Did he do it to steal 
a march on his creditors? Was it to protect members of his family from 
claims against their future well-being? Was it to simply join a trend of 
incorporation that was becoming more common among small business? 
Was it a matter of commercial gain getting the better of his membership 
in a moral community?13 
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 12. Although the soon-to-be-created company had a trustee, as Ireland points out, “Salomon, as 
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complained that the debenture was “trifling,” merely “a piece of paper stamped with the seal of the 
company, and containing some special words,” and no more. A. D. Tyssen, Company Law Reform, 
24 LAW. MAG. & REV. Q. REV. JURIS. 5TH SER. 271, 273 (1898–99). We discuss further the issue of 
debentures and debenture holders below. 
 13. Rubin is partially of the mind that Salomon could not shake his sense of obligation as a 
“provide[r]” for his family, and that ultimately, he “place[d] his children’s interests, as he perceived 
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Aron began the process by entering into an agreement with a trustee 
for the future company, Adolph Anholt, to purchase the business from 
Aron. For these purposes, the business was valued at a modest £40,000. 
The Companies Act 1862 required that a corporation have at least seven 
shareholders,14 so Aron, his wife, and five of his children signed the 
memorandum of incorporation with each taking one £1 share. By way of 
compensation, Aron received £1000 cash,15 was granted 20,000 shares of 
the new company (which meant he held 20,001 of the shares issued), and 
was approved for 100 £100 debentures for a total of £10,000. The com-
pany was incorporated on July 28, 1892 as “A. Salomon & Co. Ltd.” 
Aron was appointed managing director and his two sons, Emanuel and 
Salomon, became directors. The first meeting of the shareholders was 
held a few days later on August 2, 1892. All of the financial arrange-
ments between Aron and the company were settled by the end of January 
1893. Little else changed—the business was still entirely family-owned 
and run. But this was when things began to unravel. 
As part of the general downturn in the economy, labor disruption, 
and the loss of some government contracts, A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. be-
gan to feel the squeeze: its unsold stock was accumulating and earnings 
were decreasing. But whether Aron saw this coming is of huge signifi-
cance in the moral and legal scheme of things. There is certainly no evi-
dence that the incorporation was an obvious first step in a larger fraudu-
lent scheme to avoid creditors or accrue some speculative profit; after all, 
Aron was not involved in an unmitigated swindle. Importantly, all pre-
incorporation debts had been paid in full. But there were clouds of ethi-
cal suspicion that gathered and swirled around the transaction, especially 
when it came time for Aron to take legal advantage of his manoeuvre. 
Most likely, Aron incorporated the business for a number of reasons. The 
most reasonable assumption seems to be that there were several factors—
                                                                                                             
them, above whatever business reputation he might hope to have salvaged from the wreckage of the 
crash” of his company. Rubin, supra note 4, at 101. 
 14. Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89 sch. 6 (Eng.). 
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fulfillment. In effect, cash consideration owed to Salomon by the new corporation was satisfied by 
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(which were eventually repaid in full). See Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) 49 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (discussing the repayment mechanics in the judgment of Lord Macna-
ghten); Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch. 323 at 324−27, 342−44; Daniel Teo Cheng Seong, The 
Salomon Orthodoxy: Unravelling the Metaphorical Myth, 21 SING. L. REV. 199, 199 (2000−2001). 
Those who are not corporate lawyers might be forgiven for their confusion and for failing to see 
beyond the artifice to some other legal “reality.” 
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including his desire for a more formal role for his children and for great-
er respectability—combined with a general foreboding about the general 
and particular economic pressures on A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. As with 
most such episodes, neither his motivations nor intentions were entirely 
apparent.16 
At the beginning of 1893, in order to tide the struggling company 
over, Aron secured a £5000 personal loan from Edmund Broderip, an-
other local merchant. Aron then loaned this amount to the company at a 
10% annual interest. On February 5th, as security for the loan, Aron 
mortgaged his debentures (valued at £10,000) to Broderip. While Aron 
retained beneficial ownership of the debentures, he agreed that the com-
pany would pay 8% interest on the value of the debentures to Broderip. 
Unfortunately, the business quickly deteriorated. In September, the com-
pany defaulted on the interest payments to Broderip. As was his entitle-
ment, Broderip indicated that he would call in the security principal. On 
October 11th, when he had not received further payment, Broderip com-
menced an action to enforce his security. Then, on October 25, 1893, A. 
Salomon & Co. Ltd. officially went into receivership. The business was 
ending, but the legal fun and games were just beginning. 
B. A Company Is Born 
Now under the control of the receiver, A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. con-
tested Broderip’s claim to the principal on the debentures. If Broderip’s 
claim were to be satisfied (as it eventually was), it would exhaust almost 
all of the remaining assets of the company, and only slightly more than 
£1000 would remain to satisfy the other creditors’ claims, which had ac-
crued to over £7500. 
Perhaps more significantly, however, the receiver also brought an 
accompanying action against Aron Salomon himself, which was the basis 
of the Salomon case we discuss here. It was alleged that the creation of 
A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. was a sham, an elaborate and fraudulent scheme 
perpetrated by Aron to defeat the legitimate claims of the company’s 
creditors. As such, the receiver insisted that the formation of the compa-
ny should be ignored, and Aron made personally responsible for the 
company’s debts. The claim would have greatly harmed Aron: he was 
being asked to give up his debentures and repay the company the almost 
                                                 
 16. But see supra note 13 and accompanying text; Marc T. Moore, ‘A Temple Built on Faulty 
Foundations’: Piercing the Corporate Veil and the Legacy of Salomon v. Salomon, 2006 J. BUS. L. 
180, 200. Not insignificantly, the practice of small-firm incorporation was booming around this time, 
so this incorporation may have taken place simply as a matter of course. Aron’s situation was hardly 
unique—many other small “private companies” were being and had been similarly incorporated. See 
Ireland, supra note 3, at 40–41, 54.  
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£30,000 in value that he had received as cash and shares after the com-
pany was incorporated. 
Not only did Aron not have such funds (valued by today’s purchas-
ing power in the millions of dollars) but he also continued to insist that 
he had not acted at all inappropriately, let alone fraudulently. As such, he 
not only resisted the receiver’s claim for indemnity but also maintained 
that, as a debenture-holder, he had his own claims against the company 
that outranked the other trade creditors. This obduracy did not impress 
the business community and also called into doubt Aron’s original mo-
tives for incorporating his family business. In slightly condescending and 
anti-Semitic terms, the Shoe and Leather Record opined that Aron 
should cease to engage in “financial juggling with a vengeance”17 that 
placed in jeopardy his “unblemished reputation . . . as one of the best 
men in the Jewish community.”18 His attempt to enforce his strictly legal 
entitlements was characterized as resulting from “evil counsels.”19 Unde-
terred, Aron continued to insist that he had done nothing wrong and he 
was seeking only to preserve his family’s name and well-being. Having 
hired Ralph Raphael as his solicitor, he set about defending his money 
and his name. 
So the scene was nicely set to determine whether Aron was acting 
fairly and, if not, what his comeuppance should be. Although this ethical 
issue was the true heart of the dispute, both sides’ lawyers framed the 
matter in stricter legal terms. Instead of addressing the moral issue of 
“fair dealing” directly, the lawyers were successful in persuading the 
courts to characterize it as being about the nature and extent, if any, of 
the separation between a company and its founding and directing person-
alities. If there was a true separation, then Aron was free and clear; if not, 
then Aron was on the hook for Broderip’s and other creditors’ claims. 
A close reading of the various judgments in Salomon strongly indi-
cates that the narrow legal issue of corporate personality was driven by a 
larger moral context.20 In other words, the case was less about corporate 
personality and more about whether the corporation’s benefits accrue to 
corporate leaders who bear dishonorable motivations. Such an interpreta-
                                                 
 17. Rubin, supra note 4, at 111 (quoting SHOE AND LEATHER RECORD 1384 (Dec. 22, 1893)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18. Id. at 109 (quoting SHOE AND LEATHER RECORD 828 (Oct. 13, 1893)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 19. Id. at 111 (quoting SHOE AND LEATHER RECORD 1384 (Dec. 22, 1893)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 20. Edward Cox, in lamenting increasing protection for corporations, suggested that what 
amounted to freedom from the “obligation to pay debts and perform contracts” represented “a prin-
ciple immoral in itself.” Edward Cox, Preface to THE NEW LAW AND PRACTICE OF JOINT STOCK 
COMPANIES (4th ed. 1857). 
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tion is given considerable traction by the fact that the principle of “sepa-
rate corporate personality” had already been in play in English company 
law for a half-century or so since the decision in R v. Arnaud in 1846.21 
Since that question had already been answered, the real issue here was 
whether incorporators could be reprimanded by virtue of their failure to 
engage in “fair dealing.” In an important sense, the more narrow legal 
issue was set within and driven by a larger moral context.22 Accordingly, 
the pressing doctrinal issue might well have been whether the legal fic-
tion of separate legal personality could and should be bestowed upon 
small family enterprises like that of the Salomons.23 But the animating 
force behind the legal arguments and doctrinal posturing was the square-
ly moral one of what was to be the standard of fair dealing and good 
business practice for small traders and entrepreneurs. 
None of this is to suggest that the resulting consequences of the 
court’s decision about the nature of the corporate personality were not 
important or profound. The general stakes were high because, without an 
authoritative affirmation of the corporation’s separate legal personhood, 
the growth of a more capitalized economy was, for better or worse, on 
the line.24 The touted benefits of incorporation—continuing existence, 
transferable ownership, limited liability, fundraising capacity, profes-
sional management, and the like—all flow from such recognition. Never-
theless, Salomon’s contemporary significance was to be found in its in-
stitutional response to the ethical inquiry about fair dealing among trad-
ers. Salomon asked: were the advantages of incorporation available only 
to those who could claim to be acting fairly and honorably or, excepting 
outright fraudsters, were they open to all no matter how sundry? This 
was no small matter. 
III. LAW, MORALS, AND INCORPORATION 
A. The Early Days 
Of course, companies or corporations have existed for many centu-
ries. In the early Middle Ages, chartered corporations were created to 
serve public goals. Established by towns, universities, trade guilds, and 
churches, the property and holdings of these not-for-profit corporations 
were separate from that of its members, like clergy and aldermen, who 
                                                 
 21. R v. Arnaud, [1846] 9 Q.B. 806 (U.K.). 
 22. See supra note 20. 
 23. Commentators suggest that whereas Salomon today stands for the more general corporate 
personality proposition, in its time it was relevant only to this narrower issue. See, e.g., HARRIS ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 73; Ireland, supra note 3, at 57–58. 
 24. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780−1860 (1977). 
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often had only a limited liability for the overall debts and liabilities. Yet, 
a couple of centuries passed before the business community picked up 
this device and efforts were taken to deploy corporations for the purposes 
of trade and commerce.25 
The immediate precursor of the modern corporation was the “joint 
stock company.” These were usually unincorporated entities (with no 
separate legal existence from its members) that served as a convenient 
conduit for profit-making investment by people with limited financial 
resources. In effect, it was simply one kind of partnership in which the 
shareholders, who could run into thousands, were jointly and severally 
liable for all the company’s debts and liabilities. It was not until the early 
nineteenth century that the British government began, by a series of leg-
islative acts, to lessen some of the impediments that prevented joint-
stock companies from developing into the legal and institutional devices 
that they have now become for private economic activity. 
While eighteenth-century British investors accepted the public-
purpose regulations inherent in their government charters, across the At-
lantic, American entrepreneurs came to regard such rules as repressive 
and unrealistic. Indeed, the American War of Independence was, at least 
in small part, a backlash against the idea that there should be a direct 
connection between private enterprise and the public good. As such, the 
United States was more willing to relax the enabling requirement that a 
corporation must advance a specific public purpose before it could be 
incorporated. State legislatures had initially granted corporate charters to 
organizations involved in building roads, bridges, and the like, or in es-
tablishing a banking and insurance network. General and commercial 
companies were few and far between. Beginning with New York in 
1811, however, some states began to permit companies to be established 
by providing only a general summary of their intended activities. By the 
1840s, most states permitted a streamlined procedure of incorporation. 
Beginning in the 1840s, the English also began to pursue a similar 
course. Most believed that England needed capital investment to fuel the 
Industrial Revolution, and that would require some protection for those 
vulnerable investors who stood to lose much more than their initial in-
vestment and become bankrupted if their firm failed. In 1844, Parliament 
passed an act which permitted companies to define their own purpose, 
and the power to micro-control economic activities passed from the gov-
                                                 
 25. See TOM HADDEN, COMPANY LAW AND CAPITALISM 3–36 (2nd ed. 1977); JOHN 
MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A 
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 51–52 (2003); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY (John Parkinson 
et al. eds., 2000). 
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ernment to the boardroom and was occasionally policed by the courts.26 
Further, in 1855, Parliament awarded shareholders limited liability so 
that their broader personal assets were protected from corporate misfea-
sance.27 These piecemeal reforms culminated in the much-heralded and 
radical omnibus Companies Act 1862 by William Gladstone’s Liberal 
government. Revered and reviled in almost equal measure, the introduc-
tion of “limited liability” was both condemned as a special favor to the 
rich and celebrated as a stepping stone for a new entrepreneurial class. 
In a few short years, the formation of private incorporated compa-
nies had gone from being a quasi-criminal activity to a government-
promoted endeavor. As Robert Lowe, the 1855 Act’s main sponsor, put 
it, “To 1825, the law prohibited the formation of joint-stock companies. 
From then to now it was a privilege. We hope to make it a right.”28 The 
prevailing view, however, was that small or one-person firms were not 
supposed to fall within the scope of the Act. Some, like Edward Cox, a 
prominent lawyer and author of the influential The Law and Practice of 
Joint Stock Companies and Other Associations, disagreed and saw no 
problems with such a legal manoeuvre.29 But the historical record 
demonstrates that the intention of Parliament (with which, insofar as it 
could be ascertained from the statutory text, the Salomon courts would 
later be concerned) was clear: incorporation was not intended for small 
or one-person firms.30 
The issue over the applicability to small or one-person firms aside, 
there were many important and telling consequences for corporate gov-
ernance in these historic reforms. Incorporation was such a sought-after 
process because of the substantial advantages it offered the growing en-
trepreneurial class: raising capital became much easier and less risky; it 
created desirable economies of scale in the production of goods and ser-
vices; it reassured and protected investors; and it permitted shareholding 
investors to enjoy the passive benefits of ownership without assuming 
the active burdens of management. Nevertheless, incorporation also 
brought certain challenges. The main problem was that as the ranks of 
shareholders became more expansive and diffuse, the gap between man-
agement and ownership widened. This increased the risk of inefficient 
                                                 
 26. Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 (U.K.). 
 27. See Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c. 47 (U.K.); Limited Liability Act, 
1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133 (U.K.); Ireland, supra note 3, at 32–33. 
 28. MICKELTHWAIT & WOOLRIDGE, supra note 25, at 51. 
 29. Ireland, supra note 3, at 36–37. According to Ireland, although Cox was opposed to the 
spreading limitation of liability, he felt that if it was going to apply, it was only right that it extend to 
smaller firms. Accordingly, he promoted how such firms might use the relevant legislation to be-
come incorporated. 
 30. Id. at 33–38. 
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management and possible self-dealing, which increased the shareholders’ 
costs of monitoring management. Also, despite legislative impediments, 
incorporation permitted some corporate ne’er-do-wells to raise capital for 
an undercapitalized (and debt-laden) enterprise and hide behind the pro-
tection of limited liability. 
By far and away, however, the most significant effect of all these 
mid-nineteenth-century reforms was to legitimate an entrepreneur’s pri-
vate pursuit of profit through commerce and business as an end in itself. 
Still, it is worth noting that, although there was an ideological shift from 
public initiative to private enterprise, the corporation remained (and still 
remains today) a state-created and state-sanctioned institution. Despite 
the continuing efforts of dewy-eyed apologists, the Victorian birth of the 
modern corporation was a distinctly political event; the company is no 
more a natural entity and its creation is no more a natural process than 
industrial production itself. As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in the 
early-nineteenth-century case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, 
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of 
law, it possesses only those properties which the [law] confers upon it, 
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”31 
While the modern English corporation was born in 1862, the con-
cept did not mature for a few decades. In the following decades, thou-
sands of companies were created and around one-third went almost im-
mediately bankrupt. This was an era, particularly in the United States, in 
which restrictions on the legitimacy of one company holding stock in 
another were removed and in which mergers and acquisitions began to 
proceed apace: big business began to establish itself, and the mega-
corporation, like America’s Standard Oil and Britain’s Lever Brothers, 
took shape. Moreover, many small businesses began to avail themselves 
of incorporation’s benefits. The Salomon family’s boot-making business 
was one of them. The much-heralded Salomon decision casted the corpo-
rate die for today and beyond. But it also managed to suggest, if not set, 
an ethical standard of business dealings that continues to this day. 
B. The Salomon Crucible 
The Salomon case first came before the Queen’s Bench Division in 
early November 1894. The presiding judge was Roland Vaughan Wil-
liams. Appointed by Lord Halsbury (for whom he had “devilled” or acted 
a junior barrister in his early years), he went on to the court of appeal a 
                                                 
 31. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819); see Seong, 
supra note 15. 
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few years after the Salomon case. His judicial reputation was of being 
something of a stickler for technicalities, a defender of the common 
law’s grounded pragmatism, and a rather all-around eccentric figure. He 
had been an esteemed lawyer, an expert in commercial law, and the au-
thor of The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy. Doing little to hide his 
well-known opposition to incorporation that he considered almost tanta-
mount to fraudulent conversion at its core, it came as little surprise that 
his 1895 Valentine Day’s judgment went against Aron.32 Although Wil-
liams found that there was no fraud on the creditors, he relied on the 
novel argument (suggested by him to the company’s lawyers) that the 
company was acting as an agent for Aron and that Aron was therefore 
the responsible principal throughout. Aron was required to indemnify the 
company for all its debts, and his debentures were declared to be unen-
forceable.33 In larger terms, this meant that Vaughan Williams had re-
fused to accept that A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. was a separate legal entity 
for all practical business purposes; the veil of incorporation was pulled 
back with little ceremony or compunction. 
Aron took his case to the court of appeal. Through his barrister, the 
established (and talented sportsman) Montague Muir Mackenzie,34 it was 
contended that Aron had acted entirely in accordance with the letter and 
underlying policy of the Companies Act. The court heard the appeal on 
May 7, 1895 and handed down the judgment on May 28, 1895. While all 
three judges rejected Williams’s line of reasoning, they still unanimously 
found against Salomon. The prominent Lord Justice Lindley, who was 
already a reputed jurist and went on to become a leading Law Lord, de-
livered the leading judgment.35 He was hard on Aron and opined that the 
incorporation “scheme [was] a device to defraud creditors”36 and “not 
permitted by law.”37 The other two took a similar line. Lord Justice 
Lopes characterized the other family members as “six mere dummies” 
and concluded that “[t]o legalize such a transaction would be a scan-
                                                 
 32. See P. A. Landon, Williams, Sir Roland Lomax Bowdler Vaughan (1838−1916), in 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (Steve Hedley reviser, online ed. 2004), http:// 
www.oxforddnb.com/index/101036928/Roland-Vaughan-Williams; see also Ireland, supra note 3, at 
50–51. 
 33. Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch. 323 at 332–33. 
 34. See Montague Muir Mackenzie, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montague_Muir_ 
Mackenzie (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 35. See Gareth H. Jones & Vivienne Jones, Lindley, Nathaniel, Baron Lindley (1828−1921), in 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (online ed. 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/in 
dex/101034535/Nathaniel-Lindley. 
 36. Broderip, [1895] 2 Ch. at 339. 
 37. Id. at 338. 
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dal.”38 Lord Justice Kay was less scathing and would have allowed Aron 
to repay the full purchase price of the company but with credit for the 
debentures (for which he had never received any money).39 So the upshot 
was that companies like A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. were a separate legal 
entity in name only and did not shield their beneficial owners and con-
tinuing controllers from liability, especially if there was a whiff of fraud 
about the initial incorporation. Importantly, neither the court of first in-
stance nor court of appeal was willing to observe only the letter of the 
law. Instead, the courts based their rulings on the very real situation of an 
independent trader availing himself of some rather impressive paperwork 
and abandoning his moral responsibilities to his business community. 
For his part, Aron was now in a real bind. He had lost not only his 
company but also almost all of his money. The plight of impoverished 
persons in Whitechapel was not at all attractive; there was the grinding 
poverty on his doorstep and the unedifying prospect of the Poor House (a 
government-run workhouse) if things went from bad to worse. To say 
that Aron and his family might literally have been lining up for gruel and 
cleaning hospital refuse in exchange for filthy shelter would involve little 
exaggeration.40 Indeed, membership in the ranks of the homeless and 
destitute was especially harsh for those, like Aron, who had fallen back 
down farthest. Such a fate was not unheard of; formerly wealthy, he 
would now be “[a]mong the very dregs of the outcast crowd.”41 So, with 
a certain moral resolve and a little-else-to-lose mentality, an impecunious 
Aron made a successful bid to appeal to the House of Lords in forma 
pauperis (i.e., he was excused from paying legal fees if he lost). To do 
so, he had to swear that he had no funds or assets at all except £5 and the 
clothes that he was wearing.42 By this point, success in litigation would 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 341. Peta Spender questions the use of the “mere dummies” terminology, given that 
the Salomon family was clearly legitimately and independently invested in the economic enterprise. 
She discusses this issue within the larger context of how, especially in relation to the law, “[f]amilial 
ideology constructs the family in a way which assumes a commonality of interests of family mem-
bers which is subsumed in the interest of the patriarch.” See Peta Spender, Resurrecting Mrs. Salo-
mon, 27 FED. L. REV. 217, 222 (1999). 
 39. Broderip, [1895] 2 Ch. at 347. 
 40. Of course, we do not know enough about the Salomons’ exact circumstances to know what 
other personal support they may have had, nor the extent to which the entire family would have been 
affected by Aron’s misfortune. But the threat of actual poverty in Whitechapel was very real, and the 
living and working conditions of the poor frighteningly grim. See, e.g., JACK LONDON, THE PEOPLE 
OF THE ABYSS 101–11 (1903); Ireland, supra note 3, at 48; Thirty Years in Whitechapel, supra note 
7, at 551. 
 41. Thirty Years in Whitechapel, supra note 7, at 551. 
 42. In re Raphael, [1899] 1 Ch. 853 at 856. 
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be unlikely to restore Salomon’s reputation in the industry, which had 
already passed its judgment,43 but it just might save his personal pride. 
The case was heard over three days in June 1896. The heavyweight 
legal team of McCall, Buckley, and Cohen QCs, as well as Mackenzie, 
represented Aron. Their basic argument was that, apart from compliance 
with all legislative requirements, the family business was in decent shape 
when incorporation occurred and that Aron had acted in good faith at all 
times. In response, the company’s barristers, Farwell and Theobald, in-
sisted that the whole incorporation was a scam and that Aron, as the 
company’s chief executive, should be brought to personal account.44 
Five months later on November 16, 1896, the six judges of the 
House of Lords gave their opinions. In an abrupt and unanimous about-
turn, they decided that there was nothing improper about Aron’s actions, 
that the incorporation of A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. was entirely valid, and 
that Aron could hold on to whatever money that he still had. In effect, the 
House of Lords decided that once the formalities of the Companies Act 
1862 had been followed, the incorporation of the company was complete, 
and it created a new entity separate from its founders and continuing 
owners. It was a resounding success for Aron and other similar family 
ventures. Henceforth, companies and their owners were not one and the 
same in law, no matter how identical they were in practice. Reinforcing a 
“corporate veil” between the company and its members, the Law Lords 
confirmed that not only an association of businesspeople could become a 
truly chartered and free-standing corporation but so could a one-person45 
or family undertaking. 
Lord Halsbury delivered a strong opinion. He was considered to be 
no great legal mind, but he exerted strong institutional influence through 
his political connections.46 As the Lord Chancellor, the country’s chief 
law officer, he was also a member of the government’s executive and 
legislative branches. Finding no provisions in the Companies Act about 
the need for a shareholder to be “an independent and beneficially inter-
ested person,”47 he saw nothing wrong with what Aron had done: 
“Whether such a result be right or wrong, politic or impolitic, . . . we 
                                                 
 43. No doubt legal victory would have been irrelevant to the moral verdict of his peers, and as 
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have nothing to do with . . . if this company has been duly constituted by 
law; and, whatever may be the motives of those whose who constitute 
it.”48 He was joined in this opinion by Lords Watson, Herschell, Morris, 
and Davey. Recurring throughout the judgments was identification that, 
paradoxically, if the receiver was right that no company was ever proper-
ly formed, then there was no company that could legally sue Salomon. 
As strong as Lord Halsbury’s opinion was, Lord Macnaghten gave 
the most uncompromising and declaratory judgment. An Irishman and 
former Conservative Member of Parliament, he was held in high regard 
by the bench and bar alike; he had a wry turn of phrase and the ability to 
give the most arcane arguments a stylish spin.49 And these qualities stood 
in him in good stead in this case. As much as he was ambivalent towards 
Aron’s situation, he was persuaded that Aron had acted in good faith. He 
opined that the other creditors had been careless and “have only them-
selves to blame for their misfortunes.”50 In a resounding statement of 
legal principle, he stated: 
The company is at law a different person altogether from the sub-
scribers to the memorandum; and, though it may be that after incor-
poration the business is precisely the same as it was before, and the 
same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, 
the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for 
them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable, in any shape or 
form, except to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act.51 
Salomon’s decisive affirmation that a company’s “separate legal 
personality” was effected organically through the judge-made common 
law. It demonstrated the serendipitous nature of the process as each court 
was unanimous but in a different direction with different rationales. Nev-
ertheless, Salomon reflected broadly the received understandings of the 
time about the need to insulate capitalist speculation from managerial 
activity even if they were, in this particular case, both embodied in one 
and the same person. This decision heralded in the twentieth century and 
set the substance and tone for much of the “corporate capitalism” that 
dominated the century. 
So how did the House of Lords’ decision impact Aron, Broderip, 
and the other creditors? The fact is that we are not sure; there is insuffi-
cient evidence available to reach any definite conclusions. Broderip was 
                                                 
 48. Id. at 34. 
 49. See J. A. Hamilton, Macnaghten, Edward, Baron Macnaghten (1830−1913), OXFORD 
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 50. Salomon, [1897] A.C. at 53. 
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out of the picture; he had been paid off and his debentures returned to 
Aron.52 While Aron would have been able to exercise his rights under the 
debentures, it is simply unknown if he did. He might have abandoned his 
claim, enforced it, or received a pro rata share along with the other credi-
tors.53 Apart from completing the story, evidence of what happened 
might shed some light on his original motivations and their moral qual-
ity, not to mention his perception in the business community. But the fact 
that he died not as a pauper, but with an estate of £503, suggests that he 
likely did receive something one way or another from the company’s 
bankrupt remains. In which case, the other creditors would be left with 
nothing. 
IV. THE BUSINESS OF ETHICS 
A. Behind the Veil 
For all of its importance (or perhaps because of it), the Salomon de-
cision was met with as much condemnation as praise.54 On the one hand, 
some worried about the ease with which the benefits of incorporation, 
particularly limited liability, could be obtained by all manner of busi-
nesses or traders; it was now a relatively simple matter for families and 
one-person firms to shield their assets from legitimate creditors. This led 
to efforts to offer better protection to creditors by placing more onerous 
requirements (e.g., a debenture registry and increased regulatory over-
sights) on the formation of companies.55 On the other hand, others cele-
brated the fact that the benefits of incorporation were now more broadly 
available and would better grease the wheels of commerce at all levels. 
Indeed, the decision rightly weakened the hand of creditors and obliged 
the more dubious among them to take greater responsibility for their of-
ten extortionate activities. 
Most significantly, Parliament stayed quiet and took no immediate 
steps to alter the thrust or effects of the Law Lords’ robust decision. It 
was another example of the power of courts to develop and, on some in-
terpretations, change legislative policy and practice. It was only in the 
                                                 
 52. It is unclear exactly how or when this occurred, but by the time of the court of appeal deci-
sion, Salomon had “paid Broderip’s mortgage debt on the debentures.” Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] 
2 Ch. 323 at 345 (Kay, L.J.). 
 53. Rubin, supra note 4, at 119–20. 
 54. See, e.g., Ireland, supra note 3, at 56–57; In the City, 17:418 NAT’L OBSERVER & BRITISH 
REV. POL., ECON., LITERATURE, SCI., & ART 9 (21 Nov. 1896); O. Kahn-Freund, Some Reflections 
on Company Law Reform, 7 MOD. L. REV. 54 (1944). 
 55. See In the City, supra note 54; Tyssen, supra note 12; Kahn-Freund, supra note 54. 
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1900s that Parliament began to reassert itself and introduce important 
distinctions between so-called private and public corporations.56 
But perhaps the most telling insight from the initial response to the 
Salomon opinion was that it was not treated as a decision about whether 
companies had separate legal identities as modern accounts would have 
it. This seemed already accepted by most lawyers and commentators; the 
Law Lords’ decision simply acted as an authoritative confirmation of this 
principle. The more pressing result of Salomon was considered to be its 
more controversial effect of extending the benefits of incorporation to a 
much broader class of entrepreneurial ventures and, as importantly, de-
taching matters of legal correctness from ethical soundness. Henceforth, 
small or family businesses like Aron Salomon’s that could not be viewed 
as genuinely associative entities (like the original joint-stock companies) 
were welcomed, albeit begrudgingly by some, into the broader communi-
ty of corporate business. The decision spoke more concretely to the legit-
imacy of certain incorporations than to the fact that incorporation was 
not fraudulent in itself. But Salomon also raised an issue that continues to 
dominate company law today—what consequences follow from incorpo-
rating a business? In particular, legislators and judges have struggled to 
determine the precise contours of the continuing relationship between the 
original and continuing owners of the business and the new legally sepa-
rate company’s creditors and other stakeholders. 
The corporate veil is the fourth wall of company law’s primary le-
gal fiction: the corporate players and the social audience suspend their 
disbelief to the alleged benefit of all. But the permeability of the corpo-
rate veil is morally contingent—the actors sometimes need a reminder 
that their play can be stopped if the show gets out of hand. It has been the 
burden of company law to determine when and to what extent the fiction 
is to be honoured, and it has historically fallen to judges to decide when 
should courts peer behind (or as jurists would have it, “pierce”) the veil 
of incorporation. Despite a century of efforts and a host of proposals, it 
would be fair to say that the courts have not managed to fashion or pur-
sue a readily discernible set of operating principles. The only reliable 
observation is that there has been a marked reluctance on the part of 
judges to look behind the veil of incorporation except in the most fla-
grant instances of intentional wrongdoing; the corporation’s separate per-
sonality is close to inviolate and treated as almost real. But the absence 
of a juristic consensus57 regarding the doctrinal basis for piercing the veil 
demonstrates that the issue is not a doctrinal one at all. Like the various 
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levels of courts in Salomon, contemporary courts tend to look at whether, 
on a very basic level, what happened between litigating parties was fair. 
The corporate veil remains unturned perhaps because its durability re-
sults from the robustness of neither the doctrine nor the fiction—it is ra-
ther an indicator that today, we think quite a lot of self-interested busi-
ness dealings are fair. Importantly, the House of Lords in Salomon did 
not simply stop at declarations of black-letter law and judicial deference. 
Lord Macnaghten waded into the contestable waters of responsibility and 
fairness: 
The unsecured creditors of A. Salomon and Company, Limited, 
may be entitled to sympathy, but they have only themselves to 
blame for their misfortunes. They trusted the company, I suppose, 
because they had long dealt with Mr. Salomon, and he had always 
paid his way; but they had full notice that they were no longer deal-
ing with an individual, and they must be taken to have been cogni-
sant of the memorandum and of the articles of association.58 
The legal validity of the incorporation was the very thing that Sa-
lomon’s unsecured creditors were challenging, so it is somewhat harsh to 
suggest that their knowledge of the incorporation is enough to make 
them blameworthy. They can hardly be chastised for finding the Salo-
mon incorporation suspect. Indeed, two different courts confirmed the 
unsecured creditors’ suspicions. But more striking is Lord Macnaghten’s 
almost offhanded dismissal of the creditors’ reliance on Aron’s history of 
trustworthy dealing, as though years of trust built between trading part-
ners do not form the basis for a reasonable expectation that debts will be 
repaid. On Lord Macnaghten’s account, it was Salomon and not the cred-
itors who had “been dealt with somewhat hardly.”59 And while he did 
voice his own view that the legal priority of debenture-holders over un-
secured creditors was a “scandal” that he did not have the power to 
change,60 his moral objections did not in any way attach to the erection 
of an entirely fictitious wall of insulation between existing trading part-
ners. 
The court’s moral attitude of caveat dantis—lender beware—
exemplifies the turning point that Salomon represents in corporate law. 
Parliament did not expect their law to apply to the likes of Salomon and 
neither did his creditors.61 Salomon’s industry peers were shocked by his 
conduct. Lord Halsbury accused the lower courts of Monday-morning 
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legislating,62 but the reality is that the House of Lords made a similar 
manoeuvre; they decided that the corporate veil was no longer a practical 
tool but a moral reality. Accordingly, the genealogy of the corporate veil 
reveals the inevitable circularity of Milton Friedman’s now-hoary adage 
that “if it is legal, then it is moral.” In ascertaining when they might peer 
behind the veil, courts have been creating the law, not relying on it. The 
general principle that the veil will remain unbreached “so long as the 
corporation is not being used as a cover for deliberate wrongdoing”63 is 
of limited use since in a sense any corporation, by its very nature as “a 
legal fiction, is necessarily a sham, alter ego, simulacrum, or façade.”64 If 
all that is legal is moral in business, and all that is moral, for the purposes 
of the veil, is legal in corporate law, then legality and morality are both 
up in the air. Salomon’s significance comes from the court’s willingness 
to decide what, in effect, was moral business. 
In an immediate sense, Salomon did indeed decide the issue of one-
person companies. Subsequently, courts have drawn no general distinc-
tion between small firms and other more populous associations. The stat-
utory distinctions have remained similarly limited, and most allow for 
one person alone to form a corporation.65 
For all of its decisiveness, Salomon left a tangle of significant is-
sues in its wake that have occupied the law’s collective imagination and 
resolve. Every one of these, ultimately, is rooted in the same basic ques-
tion of fairness that the courts and the litigants grappled with in 1896. 
Some questions include the following: 
• Can shareholders ever be liable for the company’s antics? 
Shareholders can be held liable in exceptional circumstances 
when there is an obvious fraud and the company is merely a 
sham or façade to cover or facilitate such wrongdoing.66 Courts 
have also been prepared, as Vaughan Williams in Salomon pro-
posed, to imply a principal−agent relationship between a parent 
company and its subsidiary;67 
• When do the company’s board of directors take personal re-
sponsibility for their decisions and actions on behalf of the 
company? Directors can occasionally be civilly or criminally li-
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able for some decisions that they make outside their formal de-
cision-making authority as directors. Of course, if directors are 
also shareholders (as many are), then such liability can be un-
derstood as a way of circumventing their limited liability as 
shareholders; 
• What is the priority of claims between debenture-holders and 
unsecured creditors? The relative priority of different creditors’ 
claims against companies is a complex and regulated matter 
that is governed by a jurisdiction’s bankruptcy law. In general, 
debenture-holders, like Aron Salomon, still have prior rights 
over ordinary trade creditors and shareholders. But many, in-
cluding Lord Watson, maintained that Salomon was as much 
about this delicate issue as corporate personality itself;68 
• Must a corporation have a certain level of capitalization? This 
requirement varies considerably from one jurisdiction to anoth-
er. A few impose a minimum amount of capitalization so as to 
cover foreseeable claims against the company, but many im-
pose no requirements in regard to capitalization other than pro-
hibitions against fraudulent dealing; 
• Can a corporation be found guilty of criminal conduct? The 
price of corporate personality is that criminal liability can be 
imposed on companies. But this still serves to protect the indi-
viduals (e.g., directors and managers) who are responsible for 
the offending company’s decisions and actions. Of course, there 
are serious challenges to identifying the requisite level of 
“guilty intent” and to imposing an appropriate punishment; and 
• Do companies receive the benefits or protections of any consti-
tutional rights? In many jurisdictions, corporations have man-
aged to secure for themselves certain rights or at least avail 
themselves of rights accorded to real persons (e.g., search and 
seizure and free speech). But this conferral on private corpora-
tions of the power to withstand legislative or executive supervi-
sion, while not being vulnerable to constitutional claims, is 
highly controversial. 
As a contemporary example of the force of “separate personality,” 
the 1991 decision of the court of appeal in Adams v Cape Industries plc 
is typical.69 Adams worked for an American subsidiary of Cape Indus-
tries that was an English firm in the business of marketing asbestos. Ad-
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ams became ill due to his exposure to asbestos dust. When he sought to 
sue the American subsidiary, he discovered that it had no assets to speak 
of. He therefore brought an action against Cape Industries directly and 
contended that the two companies should be treated as being part of one 
and the same economic enterprise. The courts decided that the action 
must fail, as the two companies were entirely separate as a matter of law, 
even though it was accepted that the corporate structure between Cape 
Industries and its American subsidiary was designed to minimize legal 
liability and taxation. The road from Salomon is not difficult to trace, but 
it continues to be contentious in its direction and destination. 
In recent years, scholars have proposed stronger normative guid-
ance. Marc Moore has proposed what he calls the “genuine ultimate pur-
pose” or GUP test that he suggests would have resulted in a different 
outcome in Adams.70 This test, which he also argues is doctrinally the 
most consonant with Salomon, would require that a corporation have in 
place a distinct motivation for its existence, in effect “a strategy deter-
mining the general direction of the business, the existence of which both 
precedes and also exists independently of the specific activity that gave 
rise to the dispute at hand.”71 This proposition grasps for more certain 
outcomes, but it is clearly rooted in the same idea that we need some-
thing more than mere incorporation to justify the limitation of liability. 
B. A Modern Resonance 
In important ways, it was the ethical dimension of Salomon that had 
the more lasting, if indirect, effect. The effect of the House of Lords’ 
decision was to give the act of incorporation a seal of moral approval. 
While the reliance on incorporation for overtly fraudulent purposes 
would still be treated as improper and unacceptable, the decision to in-
corporate would not necessarily be considered unethical even if, as in 
Aron Salomon’s situation, it brought hardship on the company’s credi-
tors. Salomon ensured that the nature of business was business, that busi-
ness ethics merely meant that the companies not act fraudulently or ille-
gally, and that traders and other business people were responsible for 
only their own interests. Salomon effectively quashed the idea—if it ever 
existed—that entrepreneurs should do more than pursue profit. Since 
then, the whole debate around the corporate veil has pushed aside issues 
of ethics and propriety to the margin. On some accounts, it has succeeded 
in ignoring them entirely. 
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In historical terms, the early years of the twentieth century, espe-
cially in the United States, witnessed the heyday of laissez-faire capital-
ism supported by a dog-eat-dog mentality. Monopolies and cartels domi-
nated the economy. But a combination of factors—corporate greed, the 
rise of trade unions, the economic depression of the 1930s, and World 
War II, to name the more prominent—resulted in a demand for greater 
governmental regulation of private enterprise in the name of public mo-
rality. 
Yet, few changes were made in corporate law. Indeed, although 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s began to address corporate excesses or 
failures through environmental and labour legislation, there was no real 
drive to effect substantive reforms to the basics of corporate governance. 
By the 1980s, under the neo-liberal patronage of Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher, privatization was back in vogue and, along with it, 
deregulation and globalization. In short, compounded by the increase in 
the sheer size and accumulated power of private corporations like Gen-
eral Motors, Microsoft, and Lever Brothers, the realm of business is seen 
to be more of an ethical free-for-all than a bastion of fair dealing. At least 
in the British Commonwealth, Salomon takes some of the credit and 
blame for that. 
Sadly, the relation between business and ethics is distant at best. It 
would seem that Milton Friedman’s philosophy of “if it is legal, it is 
moral” has prevailed. Friedman took the view that that corporate execu-
tives have a duty “to make as much money as possible while conforming 
to their basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those 
embodied in ethical custom.”72 He went on to say, however, that 
the only entities who can have responsibilities are individu-
als . . . . A business cannot have responsibilities. So the question is, 
do corporate executives, provided they stay within the law, have re-
sponsibilities in their business activities other than to make as much 
money for their stockholders as possible? And my answer to that is, 
no, they do not.73 
This is less an ethical stance than an abdication of the whole idea that 
there is anything that resembles ethics in business. Salomon can be 
viewed as the precursor of such a lamentable attitude. 
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C. Aron’s Aftermath 
While we cannot really know for sure, it could not have been easy 
for Aron Salomon to turn his head and ignore his community’s calls for 
him to live up to his moral reputation. As Rubin notes, Aron’s reputation 
was absolutely “demolished” during this whole affair.74 After thirty years 
of being “so honorably known,”75 he was thrust into a dilemma that any 
one of us would dread. And for him, there would be no happy ending. 
Sadly, Aron suffered a stroke and was dead within months of the final 
decision in Salomon. He was sixty and died intestate (without a will) on 
May 13, 1897. As so often occurred, the children carried a heavy burden 
in continuing the family’s commercial ventures, as the name “Salomon” 
was hardly a synonym for a solid investment opportunity. The family 
business in Northampton had failed around the same time as the family-
named company went into liquidation. In 1912, the Salomon brothers 
resurrected A. Salomon & Co. Ltd., which had been formally dissolved 
in 1907, but the business failed once more in 1915 along with the rest of 
their ventures including a decade-long liquidation process for Fitzwell. 
The veil of incorporation may have parried some of the commercial 
blows that struck the family’s footwear business, but it could not save it 
entirely from a continued economic onslaught. The idea of the company 
still lives on, but this particular company soon received the proverbial 
boot. 
But the Salomon litigation did not die with Aron. His lawyer, Ralph 
Raphael, brought an action for unpaid legal bills against Aron’s estate. In 
re Raphael was heard and decided in February 1899.76 Aron’s son, 
Emanuel, took up the litigation cudgels on his father’s behalf. He argued 
that, as a pauper, Aron should not be required to pay. Mr. Justice 
Kekewich did not agree and ordered Raphael to be paid out of whatever 
was left in Aron’s estate. He reasoned that the upshot of Salomon was 
that “though [Aron] was not thereby made a wealthy man, he was reha-
bilitated, and removed from the list of paupers.”77 So Aron’s triumph in 
Salomon was rendered somewhat Pyrrhic. He died much as he came to 
Whitechapel, with little wealth to his name. The fact that Aron’s reputa-
tion lives on through legal history as the patron saint of all one-person 
companies would likely have been of little comfort to him and his fami-
ly. Like so many others, he remains both hero and villain of this particu-
lar piece. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
It would be heartening if we could conclude that Salomon no longer 
inhabits the boardrooms and backrooms of business. But the fact is that 
business ethics is more about business than ethics. Although many critics 
discuss the need for a higher moral obligation in business dealings, there 
is little on display to support that. The recent shenanigans on Wall Street 
and in London offer ample evidence of the unsettling reality behind the 
empty rhetoric. Although “corporate social responsibility” is the new 
buzzword of the corporate marketplace, there is little substantive effort to 
transform business conduct and its controlling standards. Like “Hell’s 
Angels” and “airline schedules,” “business ethics” is another candidate 
for the dictionary of oxymorons. Salomon’s Law Lords might be less 
sanguine about the wisdom of their decision if they had known the kind 
of business ethics their decision has created. 
